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LAWFUL "IMPERMANENT" RESIDENCE: DEPOR-
TATION WITHOUT WARNING FOR
MINOR DRUG OFFENSES
Deportation of lawfully admitted permanent residents of the Uni-
ted States for drug offenses has been statutorily permitted for more than
fifty years.1 Conviction for simple possession of marijuana, however,
has provided a basis for banishment for only fifteen years. As an in-
creasing number of legislative bodies move toward decriminalization of
possession of marijuana for personal use,' the disproportionate nature
of the additional federal deportation consequence has become increas-
ingly apparent.
Among the hundreds of congressionally determined grounds for
expulsion,4 mere possession stands out as one of the most trivial trans-
gressions for which an alien can be deprived of continued residence
in this country. Moreover, a certain degree of inconsistency permeates
the law: while the Immigration and Naturalization Service, (the Serv-
ice), a division of the Justice Department, is ridding the country of
aliens convicted for possession, the Drug Enforcement Agency, another
law enforcement arm of the Justice Department, has declared its utter
lack of interest in persons known to be only in possession.5
Unlike aliens found deportable for other criminal conduct,6 drug
1. Act of May 26, 1922, ch. 212, 42 Stat. 596. Prior to 1952, however, depor-
tation on the basis of narcotics violations was provided for in tax and other legislation
rather than directly as part of a comprehensive body of immigration law. See generally
1 C. GORDON & H. RoSENFrELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 4.17, at 4-125
(rev. ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as GORDON & ROSENFmLD].
2. Act of July 14, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-648, § 9, 74 Stat. 504, amending 8 U.S.C.
§ 1251(a)(11) (1970).
3. See ORE. Rlv. STAT. §§ 474.010-.990 (1974); CALIFORNIA SENATE SELECT
COMM. ON CONTROL OF MARIJUANA, MARIJUANA: BEYOND MISUNDERSTANDING 7, 10-
13 (1974); NATIONAL COMf'N ON M RIJUANA AND DRUG ABUSE, MARIJUANA: A SIG-
NAL OF MISUNDERSTANDNG (1972).
4. Over 20 years ago, one commissioner of immigration speculated that there ex-
isted at that time in excess of 700 distinct grounds for deportation. Hearings Before
the Senate Appropriations Comm. on Dep't of Justice Appropriation for 1954, 83d
Cong., 1st Sess. 250 (1953). This number is continually subject to fluctuation, mostly
upward, as more crimes are found to involve moral turpitude the conviction of which
may lead to deportation. See 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (4) (1970).
5. Interview with John R. Bartels, Jr., in U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Apr. 1,
1974, at 38, reprinted in DRUG ENFORCEMMNT 1 (Summer 1974).
6. Immigration & Nationality Act of 1952, § 241(a) (4), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (4)
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offenders are virtually precluded from obtaining relief from expulsion.
No distinction is made between the international traffickers and ped-
dlers in heroin and other "hard" drugs at whom the law was initially
aimed 7 and the youthful transferees and users who are the victims of
(1970). This portion of the deportation section of the act renders any alien convicted
of one or more crimes involving moral turpitude immediately subject to the deportation
laws. See generally GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 1, §§ 4.12-.14e.
7. In Matter of V-, 1 I.&N. Dec. 160 (Board of Immig. App. 1941). In Matter of
V-, the court cited passages from the Congressional Record as indicating the express
view of the legislators "that the guiding purpose of the Act. . . was to provide for the
deportation of the distributor of narcotics rather than the receiver." Id. at 161-62. The
Board recited the following: "House Report No. 1373 (71st Cong., 2d sess.) stated that:
'The main purpose of this bill is to permit the Government to deport the alien smugglers
and those aliens higher up in the big international rings who are worse than murderers.'
[H.R. REP. No. 1373, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1930).]
"On July 2, 1930, Representative Fish suggested an amendment to the bill excepting
the addict who was not a dealer or a peddler. Thereupon the following colloquy re-
suited:
"[Mr. O'Connor:] 'Reserving the right to object, the gentleman's amendment goes
somewhat in the direction I had in mind. The criminal the gentleman is trying to get
at is the distributor[?]'
"[Mr. Fish:] 'The dealer and peddler; yes.'
"[Mr. O'Connor:] 'But there is still in the bill a matter which I object to, "posses-
sion."'
"[Mr. Fish:] 'But that would not make any difference unless the man is a dealer
or peddler. That is excepted.'
"[Mr. O'Connor:] 'But this point has not been covered. The bill reads "except
an addict." I could imagine an alien child, not any addict, having this stuff in its pos-
session, somewhat innocently, or not criminally guilty, and yet he could be deported.
The gentleman does not want that.'
"[Mr. Fish:] 'I certainly do not.'
"[Mr. O'Connor:] 'Why does the gentleman not leave out the possession and simply
make it seller[?]'
"[Mr. Fish:] 'I am willing to strike out the word "possession."'
"[Mr. Johnson:] 'I wish the gentleman would do that. The entire House is unani-
mous on this. We want to get the big fellow.' [72 CONG. REc. 12367 (1930).]
"Before final passage, however, both the word 'possession' and 'use' were omitted.
[Id. at 12453.]
In the course of the hearings on House bill 5138 before the Senate subcom-
mittee, Senator Danaher adverted to the severity involved in making any violation of
the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 a deportable offense. Particularly pertinent is the fol-
lowing discussion at page 33 of the report containing a transcript of these hearings:
"[Senator Danaher:] 'But granting we include as a deportable offense a violation
of State law, are you going to do it, as you say in line 13, at any time after entry, and
make it a more drastic deportable offense, for instance, than in the case of a fellow who
is guilty of highway robbery?'
"[Mr. Shaughnessy:] 'That is true, Senator Danaher. There has been considerable
objection to it, because, like the discussion we had on titles I and II, the man may have
lived here for so long, and he would be deportable on his first offense. While it is not
retroactive, there is no time limit against his deportation. I think other witnesses will
object to that provision of the section because of the drastic nature, in that there is no
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these harsh measures today. It is the failure to draw such valid dis-
stinctions which consistently generates many of the most troublesome
problems and the least supportable results in our immigration law.8
Although most problems involving immigration law are properly
resolved in administrative proceedings or in the federal courts charged
with their review, a newer development, largely unforeseen by Congress,
has arisen in a third arena-the state criminal tribunal. It is this forum
in which most deportable convictions occur. It is, therefore, the source
to which the Service must look to provide a basis upon which depor-
tation proceedings may be instituted.
By approaching the dilemma of the alien-defendent charged with
a deportable drug offense primarily from the point of view of the in-
tegrity of the administration of the state's criminal justice system, the
Supreme Court of California in People v. Superior Court (Giron)9 neatly
avoided potential collision with the federal deportation scheme. In a
unanimous decision, authored by Chief Justice Wright, the supreme
court held that lack of awareness of the deportation consequence at the
time of entering a guilty plea to a charge of possession of marjuana
could, as a matter of law, constitute good cause for vacating the plea.
Although the court, in agreement with other appellate courts, 10
statute of limitations against deportation for the first offense.'
"[Senator Danaher:] 'In other words, let me rephrase it: Some of the most serious
felonies for which deportation may ensue require that they be committed within 5 years
after entry, or deportation will not follow?'
"[Mr. Shaughnessy:] 'That is correct, Senator.'
"[Senator Danaher:] 'And yet you would take, here, any number of young people,
particularly, who violate the Marihuana Tax Act, who smoke these so-called reefer cig-
arettes, and make them deportable, no matter when they came in[?]'
"[Mr. Shaughnessy:] 'That is correct, sir.'
"[Senator Danaher:] 'Well, that is outrageous.' [Hearing on H. 5138 Before a
Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 33 (1940).]"
8. The law pertaining to alienage has evolved in a notably zigzag pattern due to
a curious series of moves and countermoves by Congress and the federal courts. See
generally Note, Deportation and Exclusion: A Continuing Dialogue Between Congress
and the Courts, 71 YALE L. 760 (1962). Because of the very nature of immigration,
and particularly deportation, law, involving both the legitimate but oftentimes conflicting
interests of international and domestic security and the individual's protected liberties,
this tension-ridden "continuing dialogue" was perhaps inevitable. Yet, in view of the
highly questionable origin and legitimacy of the very power to expel, as well as the arbi-
trariness of its subsequent exercise, such a dialogue was also highly desirable. See also
Hesse, The Constitutional Status of the Lawfully Admitted Permanent Resident Alien:
The Pre-1917 Cases, 68 YALE L.J. 1578 (1959).
9. 11 Cal. 3d 793, 523 P.2d 636, 114 Cal. Rptr. 596 (1974).
10. See, e.g., United States v. Santelises, 476 F.2d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1973); United
States v. Sambro, 454 F.2d 918, 922-23 (D.C. Cir. 1971); United States ex rel. Durante
v. Holton, 228 F.2d 827, 830 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 963 (1956); Joseph v.
Esperdy, 267 F. Supp. 492, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Tafoya v. State, 500 P.2d 247, 251
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declined to find a judicial duty to disclose the federal deportation law
to an alien who is considering pleading guilty," the Giron court did
depart from all reported precedents in two particular respects. First,
the court's enlightened result, even though vulnerable,12 will save one
alien from the trap set for him when he entered an ignorant plea.
Giron may eventually be deported if convicted on the merits, but he
will not be banished as a result of his illusory bargain. Secondly, the
court's reasoning includes a commendable unwillingness to be control-
led by the standard "collateral consequences" rubric which has uni-
formly mesmerized other courts confronted with this problem in the
past.' 3 Instead of merely focusing on the federal source of the added
post-conviction sanction, the supreme court approached the problem
from the perspective of the alarming outcome to the uninformed alien.
Thus, the court was willing to vacate the guilty plea irrespective of
whether the added sanctions were "criminal or civil, direct or conse-
quential."' 4
Yet the difficulties of the decision should not be overlooked. As
is inherent in any decision couched in terms of discretion rather than
entitlement, it affords scant protection for numerous other aliens who
will fall victim to the peculiarly predatory and invisible application of
the law. While fair process was the undoubted goal in Giron, isolated
instances of even the most commendable and generous extensions of
grace can never substitute for available safeguards which should be
erected around a definable and recurring set of circumstances from
which there is no other humane relief presently provided in law."5
This note will suggest an alternative approach which both accom-
modates the present overly stringent federal immigration law and pro-
tects the values inherent in fair process. In calling for what has been
aptly termed in analogous contexts a "judicially declared rule of crimi-
nal procedure,"' 6 the writer will show that such has been the preferred
remedy in other simliar situations in California involving especially
(Alas. 1972); People v. Flores, 38 Cal. App. 3d 484, 487-88, 113 Cal. Rptr. 272, 274
(1974).
11. 11 Cal. 3d at 797, 523 P.2d at 639, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 599.
12. See notes 120-22 & accompanying text infra.
13. See United States v. Santelises, 476 F.2d 787, 790 n.4 (2d Cir. 1973); United
States v. Sambro, 454 F.2d 918, 922-24 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Tafoya v. State, 500 P.2d
247, 250-51 (Alas. 1972); People v. Flores, 38 Cal. App. 3d 484, 487, 113 Cal. Rptr.
272, 275 (1974).
14. 11 Cal. 3d at 797, 523 P.2d at 639, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 599.
15. Hesse, The Constitutional Status of the Lawfully Admitted Permanent Resi-
dent Alien: The Inherent Limits of the Power to Expel, 69 YALE L.J. 262, 290 n.176
(1959).
16. E.g., In re Yurko, 10 Cal. 3d 857, 864, 519 P.2d 561, 565, 112 Cal. Rptr. 513,
517 (1974); People v. Vickers, 8 Cal. 3d 451, 461, 503 P.2d 1313, 1321, 105 Cal. Rptr.
$05, 313 (1972); People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 442, 282 P.2d 905, 910 (1955).
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burdensome side effects of criminal convictions.17  The suggested rule
is that an alien be made aware on the record by some cautionary state-
ment that his plea of guilty will render him subject to federal deporta-
tion.
People v. Superior Court (Giron)
Jose R. Giron is a lawfully admitted permanent resident of the
United States. He is a native and citizen of El Salvador who came to
this country with his family in 1966 at the age of 14. In 1970, Giron
was arrested and charged with felonious possession of marijuana. Af-
ter pleading not guilty, Giron was offered the opportunity to withdraw
the original plea and to plead guilty to a misdemeanor charge. In return,
the prosecutor promised to recommend probation. Giron agreed to the
bargain.
After accepting Giron's substituted plea, the trial judge referred
the case to the probation department and the cause was continued on
the court's calendar for sentencing. On November 5, 1970, the trial
court ordered that the imposition of sentence be suspended and placed
Giron on probation for three years. 8
On June 11, 1971, the United States Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service served Giron with an order to show cause charging that
he was subject to deportation pursuant to section 241(a)(11) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act 9 on the basis of his California
17. See notes 88-110 & accompanying text infra.
18. 11 Cal. 3d at 795, 523 P.2d at 638, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 598. One question not
raised in Giron is how it happened that neither the judge nor the prosecutor was aware
of the deportation consequence. A trial judge is required to consider the contents of
the probation report before sentencing the defendant. See CAL. PEN. CODE § 1203(a)
(West Supp. 1974). Giron had only been in this country a few years, a fact which
should have been obvious from his report which, in accordance with the statute, included
a "prior history and record of the person." Id.
Furthermore, California law requires arresting officials to notify the Service upon
arrest of persons for specified drug offenses if the individual apprehended is suspected
of being an alien. See CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE § 11369 (West Supp. 1974). Appar-
ently state officials do not inform the alien or his counsel that the immigration authori-
ties have been notified of his arrest.
19. Immigration & Nationality Act of 1952, § 241(a) (11), 8 U.S.C. §
1251(a) (11) (1970) provides: "Any alien in the United States. . .shall, upon the or-
der of the Attorney General, be deported who ...is, or hereafter at any time after
entry has been, a narcotic drug addict, or who at any time has been convicted of a viola-
tion of, or a conspiracy to violate, any law or regulation relating to the illicit possession
of or traffic in narcotic drugs or marihuana, or who has been convicted of a violation
of, or a conspiracy to violate, any law or regulation governing or controlling the taxing,
manufacture, production, compounding, transportation, sale, exchange, dispensing, giving
away, importation, exportation, or the possession for the purpose of the manufacture,
production, compounding, transportation, sale, exchange, dispensing, giving away, impor-
tation, or exportation of opium, coca leaves, heroin, marihuana, any salt derivative or
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conviction. On August 27, 1971, Giron returned to the trial court
where his motion to withdraw his guilty plea and to have his order of
probation vacated was granted. The basis for the motion to vacate his
guilty plea was his ignorance of the deportation consequence at the time
he agreed to the misdemeanor conviction and probationary status in ex-
change for his concession of guilt.2"
The people appealed. The court of appeal reversed and held that
ignorance of the collateral federal consequence of a plea in a state court
could not, as a matter of law, constitute good cause for invalidating that
plea.2 The California Supreme Court overturned the court of appeal,
thereby upholding the trial court's exercise of discretion:
When, as here, the accused entered his plea without knowledge of
or reason to suspect severe collateral consequences, the court could
properly conclude that justice required the withdrawal of the
plea .... 22
In so holding, the supreme court clearly rejected, but neglected
to discuss, the middle court's reversal of the trial court's decision.
While such a failure is not necessarily noteworthy in all cases, when the
lower appellate court's conclusion appears to coincide with virtually all
of the federal and state authority on the question, an otherwise rather
innocuous affirmation of an exercise of discretion takes on increased
interest. The decision can be seen to signal at least a modest shift in
judicial satisfaction with and sensitivity to the federally dictated but un-
revealed deportation possibility flowing from a state conviction.
Although the court of appeal in Giron failed to distinguish the
facts of the case from those of the related federal holdings it cited as
controlling, there do exist distinctions which merit consideration. First,
the court cited United States v. Sambro,2 3 in which the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit decided that the misapprehension by an alien and his
counsel of the likelihood of deportation did not require a finding of
abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of a motion to withdraw
the alien's guilty plea. The case is similar to a very recent California
case, People v. Flores,24 cited by the California Supreme Court in
Giron, in which the alien-defendant merely miscalculated the risk of
deportation, 5 and his conviction was upheld. In contrast, Giron was
preparation of opium or coca leaves or isonipecaine or any addiction-forming or addic-
tion-sustaining opiate .... ." See generally Holzman, Narcotics Convictions and the
Alien, 50 Interpreter Releases No. 42, at 277 (Oct. 8, 1973).
20. 11 Cal. 3d at 795-96, 523 P.2d at 638, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 598.
21. People v. Superior Court (Giron), 110 Cal. Rptr. 704, 705 (1973), vacated,
11 Cal. 3d 793, 523 P.2d 636, 114 Cal. Rptr. 596 (1974).
22. 11 Cal. 3d at 798, 523 P.2d at 639-40, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 599-600 (emphasis
added).
23. 454 F.2d 918 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
24. 38 Cal. App. 3d 484, 113 Cal. Rptr. 272 (1974).
25. Id. at 486-87, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 273.
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totally unaware even of the existence of the possibility of deportation.
Secondly, the court of appeal in Giron quoted with approval the re-
ference in Sambro to the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Brady v. United States.26  There, in the Sambro court's view, the Su-
preme Court by implication drew a distinction between direct and other
consequences of a guilty plea.
Apparently the California court of appeal failed to consider the
fact that Giron's plea was vacated before sentencing in accordance with
the appropriate pre-sentence standard set forth in section 1018 of the
Penal Code.28 Brady, however, had announced a standard for testing
the voluntariness of pleas attacked after sentencing.29 Generally by
then the state is likely to have gained a greater interest in protecting its
convictions from postponed challenges for the practical reason that the
prosecution's position will suffer irreparable prejudice due to the natural
dissipation of its evidence over time. In fact, a far more lenient pre-
sentence standard was outlined in Kercheval v. United States30 some
forty-three years before Brady. The Supreme Court there held that any
fair and just reason will serve to support a withdrawal before sentenc-
ing.83
Aside from a single footnote reference to the trial court's specific
authority32 to grant Giron's motion to vacate, the supreme court in effect
downplayed the dual aspect of the post-conviction vacation remedy and
26. 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
27. 110 Cal. Rptr. at 706.
28. Penal Code section 1018 provides: "On application of the defendant at any
time before judgment the court may. .. for good cause shown, permit the plea of guilty
to be withdrawn and a plea of not guilty substituted." The legislature has further in-
structed that "[t]his section shall be liberally construed to effect these objects and to
promote justice." CAL. PEN. CODE § 1018 (West 1970).
29. The distinction was discussed in Judge Bazelon's dissent in United States v.
Sambro, 454 F.2d 918, 924, 925-27 (D.C. Cir. 1971), where he explained the two sep-
arate standards which are followed in the federal courts. See FED. R. CRiM. P. 32(d);
ABA, PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUsTICE, STANDARDS RELATING
TO PLEAS OF GuiTY § 2.1 (Approved Draft, 1968). See also D. NEWMN, CoNvIc-
TION: Trm DETERM NATION OF GUiLT OR INNOCENCE WrrHouTr TmRIL 36 (1966).
30. 274 U.S. 220 (1927). The less demanding Kercheval pre-sentence standard
is the correct measure in Giron's situation. The decision by the court of appeal in the
Giron case does not appear to be based on a wholly consistent rationale, for the reason
that in one part of the decision the court pointed out that the trial court mistakenly re-
lied upon an old California case involving a post-sentence writ of coram nobis, People
v. Savin, 37 Cal. App. 2d 105, 98 P.2d 773 (1940), while in another part of the opinion
the court itself relied on the holding in United States v. Sambro, 454 F.2d 918 (D.C.
Cir. 1971), which also incorrectly resorted to the post-sentence guide in a pre-sentence
situation. Compare 110 Cal. Rptr. at 705, with id. at 706.
31. 274 U.S. at 224.
32. People v. Savin, 37 Cal. App. 2d 105, 98 P.2d 773 (1940), cited in People
v. Superior Court (Giron), 11 Cal. 3d 793, 797 n.5, 523 P.2d 636, 639 n.5, 114 Cal.
Rptr. 596, 599 n.5 (1974).
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upheld the trial court's action without elaborating on its reasons for
doing so. The rub here is the court's use of broad language to dispense
with these mundane distinctions without replacing the standards dis-
carded. This approach frequently sounds better than it wears. There-
fore, the failure of the California Supreme Court to define a workable
standard addressed to the problem of the alien threatened with federal
deportation for his state guilty plea conviction of possession of mari-
juana only serves to obfuscate further the posture to be taken by trial
courts in the future. Granting that the pre-sentence/post-sentence dis-
tinction is flimsy when so central a matter as the right to remain in the
United States is at stake, the plain need for an approach better suited
to the gravity of the deportation threat is presented. The result of the
court's incomplete treatment of the problem in Giron is that each alien's
alleged ignorance must be examined by trial courts in the future to see
whether in the circumstances, considering all relevant factors, the
alien's ignorance merits the favorable exercise of the court's inherent
discretion. This is invariably a difficult assignment. It could have been
avoided altogether had the supreme court simply declared that justice
demanded the vacation of the ignorant plea and the establishment of
a rule of disclosure, rather than enshrouding its conclusions in tradi-
tional terms of a limited power of appellate review.
Furthermore and perhaps farthest from the contemplation of the
court, the decision is dangerously susceptible to an attempt by the Ser-
vice, to convince the federal courts, as it has in the past,3 3 to refuse to
give effect to state court orders which modify convictions solely to
avoid the federal sanction. That is, in basing its decision on the dis-
cretionary power of the court and, further, in expressly limiting the
justification for vacating the plea to a single ground which is with-
in a strictly federal domain, the court may have unwittingly invited
a challenge to the trial court's exercise of discretion on the ground
that it had, in fact, none to exercise. Worse, it could be claimed
that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to vacate the guilty plea absent
an assertion by the California Supreme Court that an alien has a con-
stitutional due process right to be informed of the deportation conse-
quence before pleading guilty.
A less vulnerable alternative than either Giron's "exercise of dis-
cretion" basis, or the concededly difficult "constitutionally commanded"
rationale,34 bound to invite federal review, is the imposition of a manda-
tory duty of disclosure of the deportation threat. The judicial declara-
tion of a cautionary statement rule is well within a state supreme court's
33. See notes 120-22 & accompanying text infra.
34. See notes 115-17 & accompanying text infra.
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competence.3 5 Moreover, the establishment of a rule of criminal pro-
cedure acknowledging the additional adversity visited upon the alien
only after California exacts its penalty, need not embrace any particular
posture toward the rationality of the federal event. Rather, a state
court could properly conclude that Congress did not intend that an alien
be tricked into suffering the calamitous consequence of deportation,
even though once fairly found guilty of a narcotics offense Congress
chose to afford him little opportunity for relief from expulsion.
The Federal Power to Expel for Narcotics Offenses
The exclusively congressional power to expel forcibly any or all
aliens, whether long settled or illegally present in the United States,
is viewed as an incident of sovereignty.3 6 Because the Supreme Court
has rigidly refused to review the rationale for even one ground for ex-
pulsion,37 our deportation law has achieved awesome and unique pro-
35. E.g., In re TahI, 1 Cal. 3d 122, 132 n.5, 460 P.2d 449, 456 n.5, 81 Cal. Rptr.
577, 584 n.5 (1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 911 (1970).
36. E.g., Galvin v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342
U.S. 580 (1952); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893). See generally
GORDON & RosNFmLD, supra note 1, §§ 1.5a, 2.1, 4.2, 4.3a, and the cases and authori-
ties cited therein.
37. From the first, federal legislation pertaining to the regulation of immigration
to the United States has included distinctions drawn on the basis of classes of persons
deemed undesirable as American residents. The first laws restricting the admission of
persons intending to work while in this country were addressed to Chinese laborers only.
See Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58. In fact, the exclusion provisions reflected
the rampant racism toward Asiatic persons typical of that period. See, e.g., Oyama v.
California, 332 U.S. 633, 650-74 (1948) (Murphy J., concurring). See also Gordon,
Our Wall of Exclusion Against China, 3:3 LAWYERS GuiLD REv. 7 (1943); Gordon, The
Racial Barrier to American Citizenship, 93 U. PA. L. REv. 237 (1945); Hesse, The Con-
stitutional Status of the Lawfully Admitted Permanent Resident Alien: The Pre-1917
Cases, 68 YALE LJ. 1578, 1587-89 (1959); Yankwich, Social Attitudes as Reflected in
Early California Law, 10 HASTINGS L.J. 250, 257-64 (1959).
The Supreme Court upheld what came to be known as the Chinese Exclusion Act
in Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581
(1889). The absolute right to bar entry to all aliens, or any class of non-Americans,
was accepted as an incident of sovereignty. Id. at 609. According to all the cases, the
power to exclude persons for any reason Congress should select belongs exclusively to
the federal legislature and cannot be challenged by the judicial branch. See, e.g., Klein-
dienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765-67 (1972); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaugh-
nessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950); Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 538, 547
(1895); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659-60 (1892).
Undoubtedly encouraged by this broad acknowledgement of the power to prevent
entry, Congress proceeded to enact additional legislation, initially directed only at the
Chinese, declaring that all of the laws already passed were to continue in force for 10
more years, and imposing a duty on all Chinese aliens to apply for a certificate of resi-
dent status within one year of the passage of the act on pain of expulsion for failure
to effect the required registration. See Act of May 5, 1892, ch. 60, § 6, 26 Stat. 25.
This requirement survives to this day, and an alien is rendered deportable for failure
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to register his present address with the government on a yearly basis. See 8 U.S.C. §
1251(a)(5) (1970). See generally Smick, Alien Registration and Its Impact Upon
Aliens, 32 INTERPRETER RELEASES 22 (1955).
The validity of the registration provision, including the deportation penalty for a
post-entry illegal act by a person who had entered with the consent of Congress, was
challenged in Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893). The Supreme
Court held the expulsion provision to be constitutionally permissible and valid. The ma-
jority perceived this provision as merely the logical and necessary extension of the exclu-
sion power. The court gave its approval to the exercise of this inherent and inalienable
right to expel through executive officers alone, without any judicial intervention or role
in effectuating an order of deportation. See id. at 713-14.
The fact that the deportation section operated to allow expulsion of two distinct
classes, those having originally secured an entirely legal entry, and those having entered
in disregard of the law, did not disturb the majority, a fact acknowledged in later deci-
sions. See, e.g., Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 234-35 (1896). An alien
was an alien for the immigration law's purposes, and no alien, short of attaining the
status conferred by citizenship, could obtain a firm and final foothold here however he
had come originally and regardless of how long he had lawfully lived in this country.
Justices Field and Brewer in their dissents in Fong Yue Ting worried that the law's
deportation provision for resident aliens signalled a substantial departure from American
precedent. See 149 U.S. at 737 (Brewer, J., dissenting) id. at 755, 756-57 (Field, J.,
dissenting). Justice Brewer also felt the law was in violation of international legal prin-
ciples. See id. at 736 (Brewer, J., dissenting). The fact that Congress could decide
to keep every alien out was no license for Congress to impose any condition it could
come up with on an alien's entry. It was predicted in the dissenting opinion by Justice
Brewer that the notion that Congress could put terms on an already established privilege
to remain would be pioked up and expanded upon in the future. See id. at 743-44
(Brewer, J., dissenting). This was precisely what transpired a few years thereafter.
The first class of persons declared deportable for post-entry transgressions was that
of women found engaging in prostitution. Act of Feb. 20, 1907, ch. 1134, § 3, 34 Stat.
899, as amended, Act of Mar. 26, 1910, ch. 128, § 2, 36 Stat. 264. The original notion
of safeguarding work opportunities for laboring citizens was thereby expanded to include
protecting the morals of society in general. In contrast to expulsion based on grounds
warranting initial refusal of admission, the law pertaining to prostitutes allowed deporta-
tion despite an entirely legal entry. Furthermore, unlike the illegal entrant who had a
right to remain if not discovered within one year of entry, the prostitute could be sum-
marily expelled regardless of her period of residence. Today there exists no general stat-
ute of limitations on the federal government's right to deport persons. In a very few
specific situations there exist five-year periods of limitation, measured from entry, during
which period the deportation triggering offense or conduct must have occurred. See 8
U.S.C. §§ 1251(a)(3), (4), (8), (13), (15) (1970). The Service, however, is not obli-
gated by law to bring a proceeding within this period. See generally Maslow, Recasting
Our Deportation Law: Proposals For Reform, 56 COLUM. L. REv. 307, 325-27 (1956).
The way was thus well-paved for the seemingly unbounded expansion of the
grounds upon which the Secretary of Labor (and now the Service) could act to remove
resident aliens. Morals grounds for removal proved popular with the congressmen. The
Immigration Act of 1917 added many new bases for banishment. Act of Feb. 5, 1917,
ch. 29, § 19, 39 Stat. 889. It was not until 1922, however, that aliens were subject to
expulsion for narcotics law violations alone. The Narcotics Drugs Import & Export Act,
Act of May 26, 1922, ch. 202, 42 Stat. 596, provided for the arrest and deportation of
any alien convicted and sentenced for a single violation of its provisions. Id. § 2, 42
Stat. 596. Deportation was to be carried out in accordance with the manner prescribed
in the Act of 1917. A similar law was passed in 1931 with one alteration to the effect
that deportable violations must occur after the law's enactment. See Act of Feb. 18,
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portions. The courts have satisfied themselves solely with containing
its more destructive wanderings, but only by regulating its procedural
aspects,3 8 hardly hampering the Service in its assigned role39 as Guar-
dian of the Gate.4°
The courts and the commentators broadly assert that aliens enjoy
constitutional due process. 41 This assertion is generally true when an
alien seeks civil relief or is tried for his criminal conduct. Nonetheless,
the anomaly of banishment shows the precariousness of these pro-
nouncements of due process; in a deportation proceeding an alien en-
joys only congressional due process.42 It may properly be questioned,
for example, how much consolation can be taken from assurances as
to the assistance of counsel,43 where, in the case of deportable criminal
1931, ch. 224, 46 Stat. 1171, as amended, ch. 439, § 21, 54 Stat. 673.
A few unanticipated wrinkles were discovered in this legislation by those courts
which had occasion to consider it. For example, it was held that the references in the
later acts to the mode of expulsion described in the 1917 Act gave the alien the benefit
of all of the procedural provisions to which they referred, and therefore the judicial rec-
ommendation against the deportation clause contained in section 19 was available to
him. Dang Nam v. Bryan, 74 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1934), rev'd on other grounds, 78
F.2d 720 (9th Cir. 1935) (Act of 1931); Hampton v. Wong Ging, 299 F. 289 (9th Cir.
1924) (Act of 1922). Other judicial and administrative interpretations of these older
laws were generally sensitive to Congress's intent to reach the drug peddler and not the
individual possessor or addict. See, e.g., United States ex rel. De Luca v. O'Rourke, 213
F.2d 759 (8th Cir. 1954); Ex parte Robles-Rubio, 119 F. Supp. 610 (N.D. Cal. 1954);
Matter of B-, 5 I. & N. Dec. 479 (Board of Immig. App. 1953); Matter of A-, 1 I. &
N. Dec. 571 (Board of Immig. App. 1949); Matter of D- S-, 3 I. & N. Dec. 502 (Board
of Immig. App. 1943); Matter of V-, 1 I. & N. Dec. 160 (Board of Immig. App. 1941).
38. See generally GOROON & ROSENFmILD, supra note 1, § 4.3b; Note, Resident
Aliens and Due Process: Anatomy of a Deportation, 8 VILL. L. REv. 566 (1963).
39. The Immigration & Nationality Act of 1952 provides that the attorney general
is charged with the administration and enforcement of the immigration laws. See 8
U.S.C. § 1103 (1970). The attorney general has delegated his responsibilities to the
commissioner of immigration. See 8 C.F.R. § 2.1 (1974). The commissioner has re-
delegated his authority to various officers of the Immigration & Naturalization Service.
See id. § 103.1.
40. The term is a popular designation frequently found in secondary authorities.
See, e.g., Zaccardi, 1973-74 IMMIGRATION & NAT. RPTR. 39, 42.
41. See Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950); Yamataya v. Fisher
(The Japanese Immigrant Case), 189 U.S. 89 (1903); Bullit, Deportation as a Denial
of Substantive Due Process, 28 WAsH. L. REv. 205, 207 (1953); Gordon, The Federal
Courts and the Rights of Aliens, 1972 IMMIGRATION & NAT. RpR. 6; S&barpf, Judiciai
Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517, 578-82
n.218 (1966).
42. Note, Resident Aliens and Due Process: Anatomy of a Deportation, 8 VI.L.
L REv. 566, 585-618 (1963); Note, Developments in the Law, Immigration and Nation-
ality, 66 Hnv. L. RFv. 643, 682 (1953).
43. An alien enjoys no right to appointed counsel at government expense. E.g.,
Van Dijk v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 440 F.2d 798 (9th Cir. 1971); Aalund v.
Marshall, 323 F. Supp. 1380 (E.D. Tex. 1971), aff'd on other grounds, 461 F.2d 710
(5th Cir. 1972); ln re Raimondi, 126 F. Supp. 390, 394 (N.D. Cal. 1954). 8 C.F.R.
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transgressions involving drugs, counsel has no role save to admit
deportability. At a deportation hearing following conviction for a drug
offense, no determination is made whether the particular alien is a per-
son deserving of consideration for continued residence despite his
crime.44 Reasons which could be considered to justify a decision not to
deport might include the existence of a dependent family, the fact of
a steady employment record, particular contributions to the community,
or any other hardship factor in the alien's life situation.45
Under the present law,46 deportation for possession of marijuana
§ 242.16(c) (1974) requires only that the alien must be advised "of his right to repre-
sentation, at no expense to the Government, by counsel of his own choice .... ." See
generally Gordon, Right to Counsel in Immigration Proceedings, 45 MINN. L. REv. 875
(1961); Comment, Deportation and the Right to Counsel, 11 HARv. INT. LJ. 177
(1970).
44. The only provisions in the immigration law which are available to the deport-
able drug offender are found in section 212(c) of the act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1970),
and section 244(a) (2) of the act, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(2) (1970). Both forms of relief
are discretionary. Statutory eligibility must be established before the favorable exercise
of discretion can be considered. The former statute applies to resident aliens who are
seeking reentry after a temporary absence abroad and are returning to a previous domi-
cile in the United States of at least seven years duration. The latter provision applies
only to those aliens who have resided in the United States for a continuous period of
at least 10 years and can demonstrate "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship."
For further discussion, see Kramer, Remedies and Relief in the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act, 50 INTERPRETER RELEASES No. 33, at 233, 237 (1973).
45. See Tutrone v. Shaughnessy, 160 F. Supp. 433, 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
46. In 1952, the present omnibus Immigration and Nationality Act was passed
over a presidential veto and amid widespread disapproval of many of its excessively ex-
acting measures. A number of newspapers carried strongly worded editorials urging
President Truman to veto the 1952 Act. Numerous commentators and various civil
rights groups denounced the act in colorful, no-nonsense terms. Much of this criticism
was read into the Congressional Record. See 98 CoNG. REc. 5791-98 (1952). One pro-
vision which received an especially critical response in the media and elsewhere was the
drug addiction ground for deportation. Id. This basis for expulsion is applicable even
though no criminal offense is committed and despite subsequent rehabilitation. Also,
for the first time, the drug offense basis for deportation was directly integrated into one
body of immigration law. See 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(11) (1970).
In Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955), the Supreme Court had the opportunity
to consider the new drug offense provision. Although the alien in that case had come
to this country as an infant some 44 years before, and despite the fact that the drug
offense conviction for which the law directed his deportation was not a ground for expul-
sion when he was admitted nor when he was convicted, the Court held his deportation
constitutional, pointing to Congress's "particularly broad discretion in immigration mat-
ters," id. at 311, and thereby taking refuge behind the political question doctrine. Jus-
tice Douglas dissented, asserting that the failure to demonstrate some connection be-
tween the 1938 Marijuana Tax Act violation for which the alien had paid his prescribed
criminal penalty, and his present desirability as a resident, amounted to impermissible
additional punishment which the ex post facto provision of the Constitution was de-
signed to prevent. He suggested that deportation on the bare record of one 14 year old
conviction, ignoring the alien's present life situation and his contributions to his commu-
nity, was repugnant to constitutional safeguards. Justice Douglas felt that characteriza-
or any other deportable drug offense is virtually automatic. If an alien
is convicted of murder, robbery, rape, or any deportable offense other
than a drug offense, he may move the criminal court to recommend
tion of deportation as anything other than punishment was anomalous in view of the
Court's previous decisions which had applied the ex post facto clause to cases involving
civil sanctions which were of a sufficiently serious nature to be regarded as punishment.
See id. at 320 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
In the following two decades few serious obstacles were presented to interfere with
the congressional exercise of plenary legislative power over immigration policy. The
federal courts endeavored to adhere to a posture of strict construction and resolution of
doubts in favor of the alien, since this approach was thought to be consonant with the
Supreme Court decisions involving deportation, for example, Barber v. Gonzalez, 347
U.S. 637, 642-43 (1954); Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948); and Delga-
dillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 391 (1947). Congress immediately responded with
amendments designed to close judicially discovered loopholes. Compare United States
ex rel. Robinson v. Day, 51 F.2d 1022, 1023 (7th Cir. 1931), with United States ex
rel. Cassetta v. Watkins, 73 F. Supp. 399, 401 (S.D.N.Y. 1947). Thus when it was held
that the 1952 Act did not cover possession other than for the purpose of sale, Mow v.
McGrath, 101 F.2d 982 (9th Cir. 1939), Congress passed amendatory language ex-
pressly aimed at ending technical evasion by the courts. See Act of July 18, 1956, ch.
629, § 301, 70 Stat. 575. Then when California federal courts refused to include mari-
juana in the term "narcotic drugs" in the Act of 1956 in Hoy v. Rojas-Gutierrez, 267
F.2d 490 (9th Cir. 1959), and Hoy v. Mendoza-Rivera, 267 F.2d 451 (9th Cir. 1959),
Congress hurriedly passed legislation in 1960 making it unavoidably clear that convic-
tion for simple possession of marijuana is a deportable offense. See Act of July 14,
1960, Pub. L. No. 86-648, 74 Stat. 504. This act was held to be retroactive in Gardos
v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 324 F.2d 179 (9th Cir. 1963). The result is that today
any alien, no matter how long he might have lived here, and no matter how exemplary
his record of residence is, can be deported for virtually any drug offense, committed at
any time, in any place. This precise proposition had been condemned as outrageous 20
and 30 years before on the floor of the Senate and stricken forthwith. See note 7 supra.
There do exist a few decisions which may be worth noting because they can be read
as evidence of general judicial distaste for the harsh result to a resident alien in the un-
yielding application of the stringent deportation law. For example, in Varga v. Rosen-
berg, 237 F. Supp. 282 (S.D. Cal. 1964), the court held that a conviction for use of
drugs was not a conviction for possession because once the drug is taken the power to
dispose of it is exhausted. The court acknowledged that Congress had dispensed with
any distinction between possession for sale and possession for any other reason, but rea-
soned that this was really only intended to lighten the government's evidentiary burden.
Where under circumstances in which the government could not on any theory or factual
showing demonstrate the alien's purpose or ability to pass the drug ingested on to an-
other, it was held that neither the language of the statute nor the intent of Congress
reached this particular drug offense.
The Board of Immigration Appeals has held that the offense of being present in
a place where drugs were known to be used was not a deportable offense. Matter of
Schunck, Interim Dec. No. 2137 (Board of Immig. App. 1972). In these circumstances
the alien was only an innocent bystander, and, the Board reasoned, Congress could not
have intended to deport a person in this sort of situation. These decisions appear to
present the possibility in a plea bargaining situation of the alien giving a guilty plea to
a lesser included or a reasonably related drug offense in order to avoid being charged
with a deportable offense. Should California trial courts demonstrate a willingness to
follow the California Supreme Court's lead in Giron and vacate guilty pleas which have
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against his deportation and the judge's word will bind the federal
government absolutely.47 Narcotics convictions provide the one glaring
exception to this unique possibility in the law for state courts to share
the otherwise exclusively federal field. The federal statute precludes
the Service from giving any effect to a judicial attempt to aid an alien
who is illegally involved with drugs or marijuana.48 Moreover, there
is no possibility of a state executive pardon.49  The courts have also
held that expungement of an alien's criminal record on fulfillment of
the terms of probation, which has been recognized as eliminating entirely
the basis for deportation for even the most heinous crimes, ° is ineffec-
tive to erase the conviction of a drug offense.5' Unlike the statutory
preclusion of judicial recommendation or pardon, the courts have
based the no expungement conclusion solely on congressional intent as
gleaned from the other strict provisions relating to deportation for
drugs. 
52
Theoretically deportation is not regarded as a criminal sanction.
5 3
Instead, it is euphemistically termed only the means by which an alien
been accepted without a warning of the deportation sanction, the prosecutor may be will-
ing in first offense situations to agree to such adjustments in view of the virtual certainty
otherwise of an order of deportation.
47. Appleman, The Recommendation Against Deportation, 58 A.B.A.J. 1294
(1972).
48. Immigration & Nationality Act of 1952, § 241(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b)
(1970).
49. Id.; see, e.g., Kwai Chiu Yuen v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 406 F.2d 499 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 908 (1969).
50. Kelly v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 349 F.2d 473, 474 (9th Cir.) (Ely, J., dis-
senting), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 932 (1965).
51. E.g., Gonzalez de Lara v. United States, 439 F.2d 1316, 1318 (5th Cir. 1971);
Tsimbidy-Rochu v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 414 F.2d 797, 798 (9th Cir. 1969);
Brownrigg v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 356 F.2d 877, 878 (9th Cir. 1966); Kelly v.
Immigration & Nat. Serv., 349 F.2d 473 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 932 (1965);
Comment, The Futile Forgiveness: Basing Deportation on an Expunged Narcotics Con-
viction, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 372 (1966). But cf. Mestre Morera v. Immigration & Nat.
Serv., 462 F.2d 1030 (1st Cir. 1972); Matter of Andrade, Interim. Dec. No. 2276
(Board of Immig. App., Apr 5, 1974).
52. E.g., Garcia-Gonzalez v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 344 F.2d 804 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 840 (1965) (approving the attorney general's position in Matter
of A- F-, 8 1. & N. Dec. 429 (Att'y Gen. 1959), which had overruled 15 years of ef-
fective expungement of narcotics offenses).
53. Lehmann v. Carson, 353 U.S. 685, 690 (1957); Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S.
302, 314 (1955); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594-95 (1952); Carlson v.
Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 537 (1952); Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 39 (1924); Bagajewitz
v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 591 (1931); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 236
(1896); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893); Gardos v. Immi-
gration & Nat. Serv., 324 F.2d 179, 180 (2d Cir. 1963); Swartz v. Rogers, 254 F.2d
338, 339 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 928 (1958). But see Lasky, Deportation
as Punishment, 17 U. KAN. L. REV. 213 (1968).
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is removed or returned following a violation of a condition placed by
Congress on his right to remain." As a result, the ex post facto
clause 5 and the constitutional provision proscribing cruel and unusual
punishment55 are inapplicable. If an alien wishes to challenge the con-
stitutionality of a state or federal statute the violation of which may lead
to deportation, his deportation hearing is not the appropriate forum in
which to do so.57 If he concedes that conviction would, without more,
require expulsion, but claims that his conviction was defective, he must
return to the trial court for relief. His criminal record, if regular on
its face, is irrebutably presumed valid for deportation purposes.
58 If
he was convicted after trial and has perfected his right of appellate re-
view, he has reached the- end of the road. If he was convicted on
his plea of guilty, however, and can make a showing of ignorance of
-the deportation possibility, the Giron decision means he has a chance
of convincing the criminal forum to abandon its prior acceptance of his
plea.
The Alien's Right to be Forewarned
Elementary concern for fair treatment of the accused following a
guilty plea includes the recognition of a judicial duty to assure that the
defendant is apprised of the nature of the charge against him and of the
consequences of his choice to forego a trial on the merits. While it
is well established that a trial judge must inform the defendant of the
possible direct penalties of pleading guilty in order for the plea to be
valid,59 more recent appellate decisions demonstrate that the courts will
also invalidate pleas entered in ignorance of consequences which,
though technically indirect, have the effect of increasing or aggravating
the punishment exacted.
54. See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893). See
also Bagajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 591 (1913) ("[Deportation] is simply a refusal
by the Government to harbor persons whom it does not want.").
55. E.g., Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy,
342 U.S. 580, 593-96 (1952).
56. Tsimbidy-Rochu v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 414 F.2d 797 (9th Cir. 1969);
Burr v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 350 F.2d 87, 91 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383
U.S. 915 (1966).
57. Matter of Gardos, 10 I. & N. Dec. 261, 263 (Board of Immig. App.), aff'd,
324 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1963).
58. E.g., Rassano v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 377 F.2d 971, 974 (7th Cir. 1967);
United States ex rel. Zaffarano v. Corsi, 63 F.2d 757, 758 (2d Cir. 1933); Weedin v.
Moy Fat, 8 F.2d 488, 488-89 (9th Cir. 1925), cert. denied, 271 U.S. 667 (1926); United
States ex rel. Mylius v. Uhl, 210 F. 860 (2d Cir. 1914); cf. Fiswick v. United States,
329 U.S. 211, 221-22 (1946).
59. See, e.g, Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970); Boykin v. Ala-
bama, 395 U.S. 238, 244 (1969); Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 224 (1927).
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Federal Cases Involving Collateral Consequences
With the exception of the District of Columbia Circuit,60 and pos-
sibly the Fifth Circuit, 61 the federal courts view ineligibility for parole
as a consequence of sufficient magnitude to render involuntary a guilty
plea made in ignorance thereof; such a determination entitles the de-
fendant to have the judgment of conviction vacated and to plead
anew.62 The reasoning behind this rule is the recognition that the
average defendant presumes the availability of parole. 63 Therefore, he
has a right to a cautionary statement when his reasonable supposition
is incorrect. Most of these decisions involve convictions resulting from
federal narcotics law violations for which there is no parole available.
Despite the purely statutory nature of the collateral consequence, the
majority of courts which have considered the issue have had little diffi-
culty in perceiving the seriousness to the accused of the no-parole factor
in his decision to plead guilty. In reality, the mandatory sentence to
which he is subjected without relief is increased contrary to his expecta-
tions.64
The applicability of no-parole cases to the problem involved in ac-
cepting the guilty plea of an alien to an offense which renders him de-
portable, without warning him of this fact, seems clear. An alien who
ignorantly pleads guilty is deceived as surely as the offender who is un-
aware of the unavailability of parole. Freedom on fulfillment of the
conditions of the alien-defendant's probation carries a necessary conno-
tation of the freedom to be free, but the threat of deportation effectively
precludes fulfillment of that promise.
Deportation is a legislatively dictated consequence of an alien's
conviction of a narcotics offense. It can reasonably be assumed that this
factor would play a central role in his contemplation of the alternatives
with which he is faced65 in responding to a drug possession accusation.
60. Smith v. United States, 324 F.2d 436 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S.
957 (1964).
61. Compare Trujillo v. United States, 377 F.2d 266 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 899 (1967), with United States v. Farias, 459 F.2d 738 (5th Cir. 1972), afI'd en
banc, 488 F.2d 852 (1974), and Spradley v. United States, 421 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir.
1970).
62. See, e.g., Otero-Rivera v. United States, 494 F.2d 900, 903 (1st Cir. 1974);
Moody v. United States, 469 F.2d 705, 708 (8th Cir. 1972); Paige v. United States, 443
F.2d 781, 783 (4th Cir. 1971); United States v. Smith, 440 F.2d 521, 526 (7th Cir.
1971); Bye v. United States, 435 F.2d 177, 179 (2d Cir. 1970); Harris v. United States,
426 F.2d 99, 101 (6th Cir. 1970); Jenkins v. United States, 420 F.2d 433, 437 (10th
Cir. 1970); Berry v. United States, 412 F.2d 189, 192-93 (3d Cir. 1969); Munich v.
United States, 337 F.2d 356, 361 (9th Cir. 1964).
63. E.g., Bye v. United States, 435 F.2d 177, 181 (2d Cir. 1970); Munich v.
United States, 337 F.2d 356, 361 (9th Cir. 1964).
64. Bye v. United States, 435 F.2d 177, 180 (2d Cir. 1970), discussed in 41 TaMp.
L.Q. 491, 496 (1968).
65. E.g., United States v. Briscoe, 432 F.2d 1351, 1354 (D.C. Cir. 1970); cf. Bye
v. United States, 435 F.2d 177, 179 (2d Cir. 1970).
1314 [Vol. 26
DEPORTATION WITHOUT WARNING
The seriousness of fthe drug charge might otherwise appear to be far
less substantial, especially where probation is offered in exchange for
his plea. Furthermore, the deportation consequence, like the parole in-
eligibility consequence, is entirely foreseeable to the trial court at the
time the alien pleads guilty. This is not a situation in which the ac-
cused is claiming a right to be informed about developments which may
occur after he is convicted and about which the court cannot conceiv-
ably be prepared to instruct him. An example of the latter type of
case might be the treatment the accused could expect to receive once
in the hands of prison officials, or the type of physical facilities in which
he will be imprisoned.
Another collateral consequence which, if unknown to an accused
at the time of acceptance of his guilty plea, will render the plea infirm
is a statutory requirement that a sentence imposed by a federal court
will not begin to run until the defendant is delivered into the custody of
federal officials.6  The Ninth Circuit held in United States v. Myers
7
that the impact of the federal statute must be made known to the de-
fendant when at the time of his guilty plea and sentencing in federal
court he was known to be in the custody of state authorities because
of separate charges under state law.
The Myers decision indicates that the court is willing to impose
a duty of disclosure upon the judiciary under circumstances which place
a defendant in a position of vulnerability, when pleading, because of
his particular status. The effect of the statute is to increase greatly the
possible length of the defendant's punishment; his plea is infirm because
he has a right to know this fact when he is deciding how to plead.
Here, the impact of the federal statute, itself a collateral consequence,
depends as well on the existence of an additional collateral fact: the
defendant's being in state custody. Nonetheless the Myers court con-
cluded that the defendant must be made aware in the federal forum
of the indirect consequence to him of having to serve his state sentence
fully before commencing his federal sentence with no credit for time
served in the former facility."'
This decision gives support to the proposition that an alien's plea
to a state drug charge is involuntary where he remained ignorant of
the possibility of additional federal punishment. It is the alien's status
66. 18 U.S.C. § 3568 (1969).
67. 451 F.2d 402 (9th Cir. 1972).
68. It is interesting to note that at the time of Myers's guilty plea in federal court
he was not yet convicted of any state offense. Thus the impact of the federal statute
upon his period of imprisonment was not certain. Yet the court reasoned that his status
as a person already in the custody of state authorities rendered him sufficiently vulner-
able to the effect of the federal statute as to invalidate his plea entered in ignorance
of this factor. See 451 F.2d at 405.
1315March 19751
as a noncitizen which automatically alters the tenor of the occasion on
which he pleads.
Similarly, it is widely recognized that the impact of a recidivist stat-
ute must be made known to a defendant where the increased sentence
to which he is subject is a consequence of his particular status as a prior
convict. 69 Again the courts do not dispose of the defendant's claim of
a judicial duty either to examine him directly or at the least to ascertain
whether he is aware of the additional burden if convicted, by terming
the consequence to the defendant merely the result of a collateral de-
termination. Rather the focus is as it should be on the realities for the
accused, not on the fact that the criminal court itself did not impose
the consequence in question.
It is clear that the courts in these cases have not felt constrained
to comment on the collateral or indirect nature of the unanticipated
consequence claimed to invalidate the plea. Nor have the courts per-
ceived any necessity to pass on the propriety of the congressional de-
termination that a federal narcotics offender is ineligible for parole, that
a federal defendant is not entitled to begin his federal sentence until
he actually arrives at a federal facility, or that multiple offenders must
pay an increased penalty for their criminal transgressions. Rather, the
cases reflect a rational willingness to accept the seriousness to the un-
witting defendant of his own ignorance. The analysis is functional
rather than theoretical.
Although the Supreme Court of California got this far in Giron,
the California court did not adopt the remedy generally employed by
the federal courts following their acknowledgment of the severity of the
unknown consequence. While the federal courts conclude that the
court's mandatory role should be enlarged to alleviate the asserted in-
firmity in the defendant's position when pleading, the decision in Giron
is grounded in the sound exercise of the trial court's discretion on a
case by case basis.70 In other words, every alien rendered deportable
by his uninformed plea will be forced to contest the voluntariness of
that plea.
The Second Circuit held adversely to the alien on the question
raised in Giron in United States v. Santelises.1 The court suggested
that since some possibility existed that deportation would not follow the
alien's non-drug conviction, the federal consequence was not inevitable
and, therefore, the court's failure to warn of the deportation law did
not render the plea invalid. 72  This decision appears to mean that the
69. See, e.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 969 (West 1970); Jenkins v. United States,
420 F.2d 433, 437-38 (10th Cir. 1970).
70. 11 Cal. 3d at 798, 523 P.2d at 639, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 599.
71. 476F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1973).
72. Id. at 790.
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court did not view the alien as being sufficiently prejudiced by his ignor-
ant plea to require withdrawal.
There are several valid responses to this contention. First, depor-
tation is all but inevitable. While it may theoretically be true that the
Service retains discretion on the threshold question of whether to bring
deportation charges, 73 an alien should not unknowingly be subjected
to this threat. Moreover, the decisions clearly indicate that other courts
do regard the deportation provisions as mandatory where a violation of
a drug law is concerned.
74
Secondly, actual deportation is a clear and dire risk of the alien's
plea, and his vulnerability to this drastic result is established with ab-
solute certainty. Analogously the right of an accused to be informed
of the maximum term to which he could be sentenced 5 cannot be de-
feated by a general contention that he may not actually receive the stif-
fest penalty.70 The very notion that a guilty plea, to be freely and fairly
offered, necessitates a full understanding of the serious consequences
of the plea presupposes prejudice to the person pleading without the
forewarning. Since due process demands that a defendant be adequately
prepared to make an intelligent assessment of the important factors in
his final decision on how to plead,77 the fulfillment of this requirement
necessarily means that the defendant have that information prior to
pleading.78
Finally, deportation is added punishment of a most drastic nature.
Practically viewed, it is the maximum penalty to which an alien can be
subjected. Therefore when a court can foresee that an alien may incur
the risk of deportation, it must undertake to see that he is cautioned
prior to the acceptance of his guilty plea. If the court fails to explain
the deportation consequence, or to see that it has been explained, the
alien entering his guilty plea has been denied due process of law and
he should be entitled to have his plea invalidated.
The Alien-Defendant's Entitlement to Equal Protection
In Giron the California Supreme Court declined to view the alien-
defendant's predicament when he pleads guilty to a drug charge, un-
73. See generally GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 1, § 5.1.
74. See, e.g., Arias-Uribe v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 466 F.2d 1198, 1199-2000
(9th Cir. 1972).
75. Cf. United States v. Myers, 451 F.2d 402, 405 (9th Cir. 1972).
76. Following his plea he is a deportable alien, and remains such for his entire
lifetime unless he is eventually naturalized. There is no statute of limitations, so an
alien convicted of possession of even a single marijuana cigarette could be deported at
any time.
77. E.g., McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969).
78. Cf. United States v. Smith, 440 F.2d 521, 526-27 (7th Cir. 1971).
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aware of the federal deportation pitfall, as requiring invalidation of the
conviction on the alien's subsequent motion to vacate his plea.79 Yet
the same court has extended the right to this form of relief to numerous
classes of defendants found to suffer similarly onerous collateral conse-
quences following convictions secured by blind pleas. s0
There is no question that a state's decisional law may be invalid
as violating a person's right to equal protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment, just as surely as its statutory law may be found infirm for
this reason.81 Moreover it is settled that a state may not constitutionally
deny to one group of persons privileges extended to other classes of
persons demonstrably deserving similar treatment absent a foundation
in reason for the differentiation." This is true even if the state could
have declined initially to afford any persons the particular privilege. 3
Once the benefit is bestowed it must be dispensed equally.
The alienage of an individual has been specifically held not to pro-
vide a basis for a state's attempt to draw a distinction between potential
beneficiaries of various privileges.8 4 Although the cases so holding
have arisen in a civil context, 5 the same reasoning is all the more com-
pelling in the criminal context.
Therefore, the question arises whether California can constitu-
tionally deny to a defendant, who happens to be a permanent resident
alien rather than a citizen, the same shelter which it has provided in
comparable situations found to warrant the establishment of obligatory
rules of criminal procedure. If it can be shown that California fails
to accord similar treatment to all persons subject to its criminal justice
system, the state's practice must be changed in order to pass constitu-
tional muster.
California's approach to the resident alien charged with a drug of-
79. See 11 Cal. 3d at 797, 523 P.2d at 639, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 599.
80. See notes 88-110 & accompanying text infra.
81. E.g., Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 347 (1879); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S.
313, 318 (1879); see Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 17 (1948); cf. Brinkerhoff-Faris
Trust & Say. Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 680 (1930) (due process).
82. E.g., In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 719-22 (1973); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413
U.S. 634, 641-46 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971); Taka-
hashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 420-22 (1948); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S.
33, 39 (1915); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1885). See generally Gordon,
The Federal Courts and the Rights of Aliens, 1972 IMMIGRATION & NAT. RPTR. 6 (July
1972).
83. E.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971); Bell v. Burson, 402
U.S. 535, 539 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970); Shapiro v. Thomp-
son, 394 U.S. 618, 627 n.6 (1969).
84. E.g., In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973) (state bar membership); Sugarman
v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973) (state government employment); Graham v. Richard-
son, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (welfare).
85. See notes 83-84 supra.
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fense which may render him deportable falls short of the standard
which the state has set for citizen-defendants who similarly might suffer
burdensome collateral consequences following their convictions. The
state has determined that where, at the point of pleading guilty, the
defendant is unaware of severe additional consequences certain of oc-
currence which will render the plea invalid, the defendant will be per-
mitted to replead to the criminal charges.
California Cases Holding Collateral
Consequences Too Onerous To Be Ignored
While the California Supreme Court has not yet expressly accept-
ed the view that a defendant should be permitted to withdraw his guilty
plea before sentencing unless the prosecutor can show prejudice to the
government, 86 the court has stated that California courts prefer to err
on the side of caution when accepting guilty pleas rather than to empha-
size mere expediency when reviewing the defendant's understanding
of the nature and consequences of his plea.8 7 In a number of situa-
tions analogous to that of the alien facing deportation as a result of a
narcotics conviction, California courts have required vacation of a guilty
plea offered in ignorance of a variety of collateral consequences.
The California Supreme Court held in In re Birch88 that the failure
to advise the accused of a statutory requirement of lifelong registration
as a sex offender on conviction of certain sex offenses 89 constituted re-
versible error. The court reasoned that the "unusual and onerous na-
ture" of the registration statute, "following inexorably from conviction,"
gave rise to the court's duty to inform the defendant of the require-
ment.90 The decision rested partially on the absence of counsel,91 but
the court also referred to the inadequacy of the record of conviction
to support the plea when challenged on the separate ground of ignor-
ance of the registration requirement.92 The Birch decision establishes
that the trial court itself has the responsibility of ascertaining on the
record whether the accused is aware of the collateral registration con-
sequence.
93
86. See In re Brown, 9 Cal. 3d 679, 685, 511 P.2d 1153, 1157, 108 Cal. Rptr.
801, 805 (1973). Contra, Neely v. Pennsylvania, 411 U.S. 954, 957 (1973) (Douglas,
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Dukes v. Warden, 406 U.S. 250, 266 (1972)
(Marshall, I., dissenting); Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 267-68 (1971) (Mar-
shall, J., concurring); Poole v. United States, 250 F.2d 396, 400 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
87. In re Tahl, 1 Cal. 3d 122, 127, 460 P.2d 449, 452, 81 Cal. Rptr. 577, 580
(1969).
88. 10 Cal. 3d 314, 515 P.2d 12, 110 Cal. Rptr. 212 (1973).
89. CAL. PEN. CODE § 290 (West Supp. 1974).
90. 10 Cal. 3d at 321, 515 P.2d at 16, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 216.
91. Id. at 318-21, 515 P.2d at 14-16, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 214-16.
92. Id. at 321, 515 P.2d at 16, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 216.
93. Id.
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In In re Leyva,94 another case involving a conviction for a serious
sex offense, the court of appeal held that the accused is to have his
guilty plea vacated if he demonstrates that at the point of pleading he
was unaware that he could be committed for an indefinite term of treat-
ment following a mandatory hearing to determine whether he was a
"mentally disordered sex offender." The decision characterized the in-
definite period of treatment consequence as amounting in reality to a
possible life commitment which the defendant was agreeing to unwit-
tingly.95 The court concluded that if the defendant were able to dem-
onstrate the truth of the allegation of ignorance, his plea would be
void, thereby removing the jurisdictional prerequisite to the activation
of the Mentally Disordered Sex Offender Act. 6 The significance of
this case to the present discussion rests in the willingness of the court
to consider independently the seriousness of a technically indirect, statu-
torily provided, effect of a conviction which was otherwise valid in all
respects. Since it was the ignorant plea which triggered the hearing,
the court accepted the responsibility of informing the defendant of the
statute's operation. Likewise, in the deportation context, when a guilty
plea will activate the expulsion provision, the trial court should be
charged with the duty of disclosing the statute's impact.
In the recent case of In re Yurko, 97 the California Supreme Court
held that a defendant had the right to have his guilty plea set aside
where he was not aware that an admission of prior convictions could
effect the penalty which could be imposed for the offense charged.
The court found "by a parity of reasoning" to the United States Su-
preme Court's decision in Boykin v. Alabama,98 as construed by the
California Supreme Court in In re Tahl,99 that the same criteria that
governed the acceptance of guilty pleas, including the requirement of
an on the record disclosure of the specific constitutional rights waived,
should apply in the situation of the accused who is asked to admit alle-
gations of prior felony convictions. 00 The court reasoned that the se-
verity of the additional consequences made possible by the accused's
admission, including the possibility of the defendant being adjudged an
habitual criminal, required the establishment of a "judicially declared
94. 8 Cal. App. 3d 404, 87 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1970).
95. Id. at 406, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 266.
96. WELF. & INST'NS CODE §§ 6300-27 (West Supp. 1974); see 8 Cal. App. 3d
at 407, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 267.
97. 10 Cal. 3d 857, 519 P.2d 561, 112 Cal. Rptr. 513 (1974).
98. 395 U.S. 238 (1969). Boykin held that there must be a specific waiver by
the defendant of his constitutional rights when the court accepts his guilty plea.
99. 1 Cal. 3d 122, 130-32, 460 P.2d 449, 454-56, 81 Cal. Rptr. 557, 583-84
(1969).
100. 10 Cal. 3d at 863, 519 P.2d at 565, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 517.
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rule of criminal procedure 1 °1 that the defendant be admonished on the
record regarding (1) the "specific constitutional protections waived by
an admission of the truth of an allegation of prior felony convictions,
and (2) those penalties and other sanctions imposed as a consequence
of a finding of the truth of the allegation."'1 2 The added burdens dis-
cussed by the court include foreclosure of the possibility of parole,1
0 3
extension of the term of imprisonment to life incarceration, 0 4 and the in-
creased time which must be served before the defendant is eligible for
parole. 0 1 In view of the availability to the accused of a trial as a
matter of right to determine the factual issues raised by his denial of
prior convictions, his admission of the existence of a prior criminal re-
cord actually entails a waiver of the same constitutionally protected
rights which are given up when a person pleads guilty. 06 Therefore
failure to be advised on the face of the record of these waivers invali-
dates the inadvertent admission.
In In re Yurko, the court rejected older cases' 07 which had ap-
proached the admission of prior convictions as "merely allowing a de-
termination of a 'status' which can subject an accused to increased
punishment."' 08  While recognizing the technical accuracy of the dis-
tinction between admission of the status of felon and admission of guilt
to a criminal charge, the court found it without substance where the
admission amounts to an unprotected foregoing of an important right,
and an unwitting invitation of added penalties. 109
The case presents a situation analogous to that suffered by an alien
admitting guilt to a deportable offense unaware of the applicable immi-
gration law. It is his status as an alien which provides the basis for
the added penalty. By confessing his criminality he simultaneously
waives in ignorance his extremely important right to remain in this
country. He too will be subjected to enormously increased punish-
ment, a "life sentence of banishment,""10 because of his status.
The California and federal cases above demonstrate that despite
the desirability of general discretion in the trial court to consider any
reason which a defendant might offer to justify the withdrawal of a
guilty plea, the courts have found that specific sets of circumstances
101. Id. at 864, 519 P.2d at 565, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 518.
102. Id. at 860, 519 P.2d at 563, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 515.
103. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1203 (West Supp. 1974).
104. Id. § 644 (West 1970).
105. Id. §§ 3046-48.5.
106. 10 Cal. 3d at 863, 519 P.2d at 565, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 517.
107. See In re McVickers, 29 Cal. 2d 262, 176 P.2d 40 (1946); In re People v.
Franco, 4 Cal. App. 3d 535, 84 Cal. Rptr. 513 (1970).
108. 10 Cal. 3d at 862, 519 P.2d at 564, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 516.
109. See id.
110. Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 232 (1950) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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merit the imposition of rules to guide all future judicial responses to
similar claims. The rationale is that because conviction of certain of-
fenses automatically carries penalties beyond the sentence directly im-
posed, a defendant should be forewarned of the unanticipated conse-
quence. The courts in these cases have not attempted to differentiate
between the indirect or direct nature of the added burden, but rather
they have granted relief when the asserted external consequence ap-
pears to be virtually automatic, reasonably substantial, and in the nature
of punishment.111 Deportation, accurately described, consists of pre-
cisely these factors.
Resolution by Judicial Declaration
It has long been held'12 that a defendant must be informed of the
maximum sentence which he may receive as a result of a guilty plea."
3
The sentence of banishment on being convicted is the maximum pen-
alty suffered by an alien for simple possession and should be known
to him when he is considering how to plead. Failure to disclose the
drastic deportation sanction to an alien charged with a narcotics offense
as minor as mere possession renders his plea infirm, if not in the con-
stitutional sense, at least in the sense of the enlighted administration
of criminal justice." 4  A reviewing court undoubtedly enjoys greater
flexibility in assessing the voluntariness of a guilty plea when it can rest
its rejection of the plea upon a finding of a manifest injustice requiring
vacation, rather than having to reach the same result based upon a de-
nial of constitutional due process."15 Thus the setting down of man-
datory guidelines for the acceptance of guilty pleas seems to have been
the preferred remedial mode of correcting recurring situations involving
ignorant pleas.1 6 Another notable advantage in setting a state stand-
ard, beyond greater elasticity in the actual election to shelter uninformed
111. See, e.g., Bye v. United States, 435 F.2d 177, 180 (2d Cir. 1970) (ineligibility
for parole); Jenkins v. United States, 420 F.2d 433, 437 (10th Cir. 1970) (ineligibility
for parole); In re Yurko, 10 Cal. 3d 857, 862, 519 P.2d 561, 564, 112 Cal. Rptr. 513,
516 (1974) (possible ineligibility for parole or extended sentence if prior felony convic-
tions admitted); In re Birch, 10 Cal. 3d 314, 321, 515 P.2d 12, 16, 110 Cal. Rptr. 212,
216 (1973) (required registration as sex offender); cf. North Carolina v. Alford, 400
U.S. 25, 37 (1970).
112. See, e.g., Marvel v. United States, 380 U.S. 262 (1965), vacating and remand-
ing 335 F.2d 101 (5th Cir. 1964); United States v. Myers, 451 F.2d 402, 404 (9th Cir.
1972); Combs v. United States, 391 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1968).
113. FED. R. Clm. P. 11 (1969). For a statement regarding the rule's purpose,
see McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 465 (1969).
114. See, e.g., People v. Vickers, 8 Cal. 3d 451, 461, 503 P.2d 1313, 1320-21, 105
Cal. Rptr. 305, 312-13 (1972).
115. See, e.g., Pilkington v. United States, 315 F.2d 204, 209 (4th Cir. 1963).
Both courses of action assure the individual added protection.
116. See notes 62-67, 88-109 & accompanying text supra.
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pleas, is the resulting insulation from federal review.117
Since it can be expected that the state courts will continue to be
approached by resident aliens who realize their error in foregoing a trial
only after being served with orders to show cause why they should not
be deported for their convictions, it seems that the legitimate concern
of the state in maintaining the finality of guilty plea convictions can best
be served by an obligatory disclosure rule regarding the expulsion sanc-
tion. Certainly the added protection afforded the alien is well warran-
ted in view of the severity of the deportation sanction. Moreover, since
Congress has selected the outcome of a state criminal proceeding as
the event which subjects the alien to the deportation threat,"1 8 the state
court should be able to require that its process be entirely fair to the
alien by disclosing the deportation possibility.
The result in Giron will understandably encourage more aliens to
assert their ignorance, thereby requiring the courts to deal repeatedly
and unnecessarily with the same question despite the lack of guidance
provided in Giron. Finally, it might properly be argued that the court
itself should be informed of the deportation consequence so that it
might better evaluate the alien's entire situation for the purpose of de-
ciding whether to accept a guilty plea at all. Or the court might in
its wisdom determine to reduce the charge in the case of a first offender
like Giron to a nondeportable drug offense in view of the dispropor-
tionate nature of the punishment which the federal legislature has dic-
tated. 9
The Problem of Possible Preemption
An important and potentially disturbing question not considered
by the California Supreme Court in Giron is the propriety of a state
court s setting aside a guilty plea solely on the ground that the defend-
ant was ignorant of a federal consequence of his state conviction. In
a few cases similar to Giron, the immigration authorities have success-
fully attacked subsequent orders modifying state criminal proceedings
which were allegedly intended to thwart the federal deportation scheme.
In this series of decisions involving attempts by state courts to effect
117. California courts can require a more stringent standard for guilty plea convic-
tions than do the federal courts. The California Supreme Court has expressed this view,
stating that: "[W]e are not precluded from adopting for California a more exacting
standard than is minimally required by the federal Constitution, whether to afford
greater assurance of the validity of convictions, to protect more fully defendants' rights,
or to anticipate future constitutional developments." In re Tahl, 1 Cal. 3d 122, 132 n.5,
460 P.2d 449, 456 n.5, 81 Cal. Rptr. 577, 584 n.5 (1969).
118. See Sawkow v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 314 F.2d 34 (3d Cir. 1963); Matter
of O'Sullivan, 101. &N. Dec. 320 (1963).
119. See generally D. NEWMAN, CoNWCioN: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR
INNOCENCE WrrHouT TiuL 177-87 (1966).
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nunc pro tunc amendments to the records of criminal proceedings for
the purpose of repairing the courts' failure to recommend against de-
portation at the time of sentencing, or within thirty days thereafter, the
federal courts have held the amendments ineffective for deportation
purposes.120 These federal courts, reviewing the state court records
on appeal from a final order of deportation, have strictly construed the
statutes empowering criminal courts to recommend against deportation.
These decisions indicate a concern of federal courts to prevent any
interference by state courts in the deportation process beyond that
which is statutorily mandated. This concern was particularly evident
in the Second Circuit's decision in United States ex rel. Piperkoff v.
Esperdy'2 ' denying a tardy recommendation any effect. The court re-
fused to allow resort to a post-conviction proceeding "in the nature of
coram nobis" to remedy the original judgment's omission of a recom-
mendation against deportation. In Piperkoff the trial court purported
to vacate the alien's conviction altogether, depriving it of finality for any
purpose. It was held, however, that insofar as the state court had is-
sued its extraordinary writ with the plain intent of evading the effect
of the Service's subsequent order of deportation, it could have no effect
on the alien's otherwise valid conviction; thus, he remained deportable
as charged.' 22
Where a state court attempted to avoid the deportation by vacat-
ing the conviction, however, including dismissal of the accusatorial in-
strument, the Third Circuit held, in Sawkow v. Immigration & Naturali-
zation Service, 2' that the original conviction could not provide a basis
for deportation; the court distinguished those cases in which the pro-
ceedings were merely reopened to add the recommendation against de-
portation.124  It further distinguished the Second Circuit's decision in
Piperkoff denying a late recommendation any effect. In the Piperkoff
case, the Third Circuit reasoned, the criminal court had by its later or-
der to vacate merely allowed the alien to reassume the position of one
who, although accused, has not yet entered a plea.121 Where a judgment
of conviction has been set aside along with the indictment by which
the defendant is charged, there exists nothing in the nature of a founda-
tion for the order of deportation. 2 6
120. See, e.g., Velez-Lozano v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 463 F.2d 1305, 1307-08
(D.C. Cir. 1972); Marin v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 438 F.2d 932, 933 (9th Cir.
1971); United States ex rel. Piperkoff v. Esperdy, 267 F.2d 72, 74-75 (2d Cir. 1959);
United States ex rel. Klonis v. Davis, 13 F.2d 630 (2d Cir. 1926); cf. Haller v. Esperdy,
397 F.2d 211, 214 (2d Cir. 1968).
121. 267 F.2d 72 (2d Cir. 1959).
122. Id. at 75.
123. 314 F.2d 34 (3d Cir. 1963).
124. Id. at 37 n.3.




The distinction articulated by the court in Sawkow seems
strained. 12' It is clear that the Third Circuit did not approve of the
Second Circuits harsh conclusion. The court qualified its holding,
however, by explaining that the Service's threshold concession of the
state court's power to issue the order of vacation foreclosed the federal
court from entertaining any argument to limit the effect of the state
action for federal deportation purposes. 128 Absent an allegation that
the criminal court exceeded the bounds of its jurisdiction or misused
its discretion it would be assumed that its order should be completely
effective in all respects.
Although Giron's criminal proceedings were not simply reopened
to add something to the record, as in Piperko f, the information by
which he was charged was not simultaneously set aside with the plea,
as in Sawkow. Giron remained accused of the crime of possession.
The trial court merely substituted his not guilty plea for the guilty plea
which was withdrawn, and calendared his case for trial. In this situa-
tion there may be nothing to prevent the Service from arguing that the
state court's action amounted both to an improper exercise of its juris-
diction and to a bad faith exercise of its asserted discretion. The state
court might appear to be accomplishing indirectly a species of substan-
tive review of the grounds for deportation where the Supreme Court
of the United States has repeatedly declined to examine directly the
rationality of congressionally selected grounds for deportation. It
seems plausible that unless the state court asserted a constitutional basis
for its action, or at the very least asserted a self-imposed rule of pro-
cedure dictated by its desire to protect the integrity of its own criminal
justice system, an alien would remain vulnerable in the federal forum.
A state cannot, through an exercise of its discretion, avoid federal ex-
pulsion for no reason other than its desire to do so. A state cannot
pass on the question of deportation in any way whatsoever save by ex-
press congressional authority to do so. 2 9
Several responses to this potential jurisdictional problem do exist.
First, there may not really be any conflict between state action and fed-
127. Subsequent federal decisions have failed to make the Third Circuit's distinction
between a complete vacation and an incomplete vacation based on whether the indict-
ment or information had also been abandoned. Thus the Seventh Circuit has held with-
out elaboration that a vacation of judgment entitled the alien to reconsideration by the
Board of Immigration Appeals. See Cruz-Sanchez v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 438
F.2d 1087 (7th Cir. 1971).
128. 314 F.2d at 37.
129. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376-80 (1971); Hines v. Da-
vidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62-68 (1940); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 42 (1915); Chy Lung
v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280 (1875); Purdy v. Fitzpatrick, 71 Cal. 2d 566, 456 P.2d
649, 79 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1969); Mackenzie v. Hare, 165 Cal. 776, 134 P. 713 (1913);
Ex parte Ah Cue, 101 Cal. 197, 35 P. 556 (1894); Lin Sing v. Washburn, 20 Cal. 534
(1862); Pople v. Lopez, 81 Cal. App. 199, 253 P. 169 (1927).
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eral law. A conflict exists only if one assumes that Congress intended
to lay a trap for the unwary alien-defendant pleading guilty to a depor-
table crime. Rather, it is more reasonable to assume that when an oc-
casion actually arises in which a specific warning is needed to avoid
misleading an uninformed alien, Congress intended that the federal im-
migration laws should not be enforced so as to work an undue hard-
ship. Thus, in Moser v. United States,1 0 the Supreme Court held that
a resident alien could not be assumed to be aware that his election not
to serve in the armed forces would preclude him from eligibility for
naturalization, where the surrounding circumstances led him to believe
otherwise. In that case the alien was misled by his correspondence
with the Swiss government regarding the consequences of his decision
not to serve."' The language of the decision does not include any ex-
press notion of estoppel, but it is clear that the Service was in effect
bound by the actions of another governmental body. This case can be
read to allow a modest amount of flexibility in the enforcement of a
clear provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act where the alien
is misled by authoritative-appearing information. The reasoning of the
case is applicable to Giron's situation in which the state prosecutor, un-
der color of authority, offered him the opportunity to trade an admis-
sion of guilt for freedom on probation. Thus, Giron's dealings with the
state affirmatively misled him. Unless it is to be assumed that Con-
gress intended that he be tricked into the dire consequence of federal
expulsion by way of his bargain with the state, it seems the state could
rationally require that an alien be informed of the deportation conse-
quence before it accepts his plea.
Secondly, the crucial feature of the federal deportation scheme
providing for expulsion for drug offenses is the underlying state con-
viction. Congress designated the state's finding of guilt as the event
which triggers the federal consequence. Therefore, it is arguable that
unless Congress expressly qualifies its reliance on the state's criminal
system, a state's inclusion of particular rules of procedure must be re-
spected. 132  Such has been the view in respect to the notion of finality
of a conviction sufficient to support an order of deportation. 3 Simi-
130. 341 U.S. 41 (1951), discussed in K. DAvis, ADMINsTRATIVE LAw § 17.02, at
344-47 (3d ed. 1972).
131. 341 U.S. at 46.
132. See United States v. Hoctor, 487 F.2d 270, 271-72 (9th Cir. 1973); Holzapfel
v. Wyrsch, 259 F.2d 890, 891 (3d Cir. 1958). During discussion of the recommenda-
tion against deportation provision when the Immigration Act of 1917 was being debated
in the House of Representatives, one congressman observed that by enacting that provi-
sion the Congress was "imposing a duty on a State court judge . . . making him pro
tanto, pro tempore, a Federal official . . . giving his acts possibly as an individual a
Federal effect ...... .53 CONG. REc. 5170 (1916) (remarks of Congressman Ben-
net).
133. Although the notion of finality is inherent in the concept of a conviction
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larly, should California decide to impose a rule of criminal procedure
which realistically recognizes California's statutorily provided role in
the federal plan, it should be accepted by the enforcement arm of the
federal government unless and until Congress demonstrates its dis-
approval.
Thirdly, even if a state's procedural rule does intrude in a field
considered to be occupied by the federal government, the nature of the
intrusion must be examined. If the overlap does not prejudice the con-
gressional scheme in the sense of frustrating the legitimate aim of the
federal law, it should be upheld if the state also has a legitimate inter-
est. Thus while discretionarily vacating a guilty plea to a state charge
on a case by case basis may effectively halt the Service's move to expel
the alien because of his conviction, it is a haphazard and thus inherently
unfair means of accomplishing a just result. By contrast, the establish-
ment of a disclosure rule giving notice of the federal law in the course
of the state's proceeding assures fair process while in no way hinder-
ing the ultimate effectiveness of the deportation law for conviction. In
reality a rule mandating the issuance of a cautionary statement would
enhance the integrity as well as the efficacy of the immigration law,
because the rule would reduce collateral assaults based on ignorance
of a material fact.
Lastly, the argument that a state court has no jurisdiction or power
to vacate a guilty plea because an alien-defendant was ignorant of the
possibility of deportation can only be based on the theory that Congress
enjoys plenary legislative power over immigration matters 13  and has
which will serve to support an order of deportation, the Board of Immigration Appeals
has held that if a conviction is final for any single state purpose, it is sufficiently final
for federal deportation purposes. See, e.g., Matter of Johnson, 11 I. & N. Dec. 401,
404 (Board of Immig. App. 1965); Matter of L-R-, 8 I. & N. Dec. 269 (Board of Immig.
App. 1959).
In Pino v. Landon, 349 U.S. 901 (1955), rev'g per curiam Pino v. Nicolls, 215
F.2d 237 (1st Cir. 1954), the Supreme Court rejected the First Circuit's view that the
Service can deport persons whose convictions are not final for state purposes. However,
the Court did not specifically disapprove of the lower federal court's opinion that the
term "conviction" as used in the deportation statute was to be federally defined, and
thereby freed from the vagaries and nuances of state criminal laws. See 215 F.2d at
243; accord, Will v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 447 F.2d 529, 531 (7th Cir. 1971);
Garcia-Gonzalez v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 344 F.2d 804, 807 (9th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 382 U.S. 840 (1965); Gutierrez v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 323 F.2d 593, 596-
97 (9th Cir. 1963). But the Court did reverse for the reason that the Massachusetts
conviction was not final for any purpose from the state's perspective. It appears there-
fore that the Supreme Court regards the state's view of its convictions and criminal pro-
cedures as a more important if not determinative factor for immigration purposes than
the general desirability of national uniformity in enforcing the deportation law.
134. But cf. Mow Sun Wong v. Hampton, 500 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1974), in which
the court asserted: "To state that Congress' plenary power over aliens enables the fed-
eral government to unreasonably discriminate against aliens, neglects to consider the fact
March 19751 DEPOIRTATION WITHOUT WARNING
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 26
not delegated any of that power to state courts. But this theory ignores
the independent interest of the state in protecting persons presumed
innocent until fairly found guilty. The theory is also outweighed by
the interest of the vulnerable alien-defendant in pleading guilty only
if he is fully aware of the consequences.
The argument favoring the invalidity of a state's attempt to find
for itself a limited role in the area of deportation law would also appear
to be defective for its implied assumption that the alien was guilty of
the crime with which he was charged. 13 5 But that assumption has no
place in the determination of what procedural fairness requires.
Furthermore if in fact the alien's conviction was defectively accom-
plished, then he remains entitled to a trial to determine his guilt or in-
nocence, as the case may be. If, as has been pointed out by the Su-
preme Court elsewhere, the alien is unfairly convicted by his own un-
informed guilty plea, and his conviction is allowed to stand nonetheless,
he has lost the only real opportunity he has to avoid deportation.' 36
That conviction record will not be examined again in his deportation
hearing for fairness of process. Thwarting the federal plan for expel-
ling "undesirable" aliens is really not the objective when a court is con-
fronted with the individual's threatened deportation on the basis of a
state court conviction which the alien-defendant claims is procedurally
infirm but which, nonetheless, provides unimpeachable evidence of de-
portability. 37  The true goal is to provide fair process to the alien ac-
cused of a deportable drug offense.
Conclusion
The alien-defendant should be informed of the deportation conse-
quence prior to the court's acceptance of his guilty plea to a crime for
which he can be subsequently expelled from the United States. Courts
cannot justifiably assume a protective attitude toward some persons who,
having pleaded guilty, face severe additional post-sentence hazards,
while neglecting to afford the same sort of shelter to other "less visible"
persons capable of identification as a class. When it becomes evident
that one group of persons is almost invariably punished more severely
than all other persons similarly subject to state criminal charges, that
class must be provided equal regard under the law. Aliens form a class
viewed as inherently suspect and entitled to Fourteenth Amendment
protection. In a nondeportation setting, such as a state criminal forum,
there is little remaining doubt that aliens must be treated as citizens
that even Congressional plenary power is subject to Constitutional limits." Id. at 1031,
citing United States v. Thompson, 452 F.2d 1333, 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
135. See, e.g., Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 223 (1946).
136. See id. at 221-22.
137. See id.
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are treated.138 The California Supreme Court has concluded that per-
sons who are subject on conviction to added burdens of a penal nature
deserve an increased solicitude when caught -unaware of the nature or
the consequences of their waiver of important rights.' 39  Aliens, be-
cause of their status alone, face a drastically different outcome on con-
viction for minor criminal transgressions than do citizens. Therefore,
a judicially declared rule of criminal procedure should be established
to the effect that a trial court must ascertain on the record whether an
alien-defendant charged with a drug offense is aware of the possibility
of deportation before that court can accept a valid guilty plea. Such
a rule would simultaneously serve three legitimate purposes: 1) it
would provide the same type of protection which has been afforded
other defendants in selected sets of similar, recurring circumstances, 2)
it would serve to relieve the state of future assaults on guilty plea con-
victions because of the defendant's ignorance of the deportation conse-
quence, and 3) it would ultimately enhance the efficacy as well as the
integrity of the federal immigration law by eliminating an element of
deceit which presently infects the law.
Mary Carol Dart*
138. See cases cited note 82 supra.
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